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Abstract
This project is an empirical analysis of trademarks that have
received rejections based on their “scandalous” nature. It is the first of
its kind.
The Lanham Act bars registration for trademarks that are
“scandalous” and “immoral.” While much has been written on the
morality provisions in the Lanham Act, this piece is the first scholarly
project that engages an empirical analysis of the Section 2(a) rejections
based on scandalousness; it contains a look behind the scenes at how
the morality provisions are applied throughout the trademark
registration process. This study analyzes which marks are being
rejected, what evidence is being used to reject them, and who the
applicants are. Our data pays particularly close attention to the
evidence used to determine whether a mark is scandalous. We also
consider whether this bar is effective at removing these marks from the
consumer marketplace.
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INTRODUCTION
Trademarks serve primarily to identify a source of goods and
services.1 This function enables trademarks to both reduce consumer
search costs and incentivize producers to develop goodwill in their
products and services.2 Trademark rights are determined by priority of
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367,
417 (1999) (claiming that historically trademark ownership was attributed to the individual who
“was conveniently placed and strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public interest in a
mark’s ability to identify accurately the source of the goods to which it was attached.”).
2 Scholars have long debated the proper balance and scope of these normative goals of trademark
law. The view that a core value of trademark law is to reduce consumer search costs is associated
with the Chicago School of law and economics. William N. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (arguing that trademark law
seeks to “promote economic efficiency”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (commenting that the
goal of trademark law has been to support information flow and reduce consumer search costs);
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1695–96 (1999) (stating that the goal of trademark law is “to enable the public to identify
easily a particular product from a particular source”); Lunney, supra note 1, at 432 (stating that
“by enabling consumers to connect information to precise product[s] more accurately, trademarks
help consumers express more accurately their preferences and tastes.”). Other scholars have
criticized this approach and argued that trademark law has historically been designed as a
mechanism to protect producer interests. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1848 (arguing that “‘traditional’ American
trademark law was unapologetically producer-oriented. Trademark law, indeed all of unfair
competition law, was designed to promote commercial morality and protect producers from
illegitimate attempts to divert their trade.”). See also Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of
Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (positing that trademark law may instead be
1
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use in commerce, and trademark registration confers significant benefits
to a mark owner.3 Trademark registration is a powerful tool for an
entity interested in building a strong brand. Among other benefits,
registration confers nationwide rights,4 serves as prima facie evidence of
ownership of a particular mark,5 and enables enhanced protections
against counterfeiting.6 Under the Lanham Act, certain types of
trademarks cannot be registered; for the most part, these provisions
correspond with the core function and purpose of trademark law. For
example, trademarks that increase consumer search costs and create
inefficiencies in the marketplace cannot be registered. These may
include marks that are merely descriptive, as well as marks likely to
cause consumer confusion or mislead consumers in some way. 7
The Lanham Act also bars registration of marks that are
scandalous or immoral.8 Under Section 2(a), marks cannot be registered
viewed as a system of rules designed to protect the integrity of a sign’s meaning).
3 15 U.S.C. §1127 defines use in commerce. For goods, the mark must be placed on the goods,
or their containers, tags or labels, and must be sold or transported in commerce. For services, the
mark must be displayed in the sale or advertising, and services must be rendered in commerce.
Use requirements support the policies behind trademark law by enabling consumers to identify
the source of goods and services, preventing reservation of rights in marks that are not being used
in the marketplace, and putting others on notice of trademark rights.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012) (“Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register
provided by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”). See discussion infra
Part I.
5 Id. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by
this Act shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration
of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to
use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in
the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.”). See discussion
infra Part I.
6 Id. § 1124 (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of any
domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in any
foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the
United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that
the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any foreign country
or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted
to entry at any custom house of the United States.”). See discussion infra Part I.
7 Id. § 1052. For example, Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act bars registration for marks that:
Consist[] of or comprise[] a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. § 1052(d). Section 2(e) bars registration for marks that, “when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.” Id. §
1052(e).
8 Id. § 1052(a). The full text of Section 2(a) bars registration of marks that:
Consist[] of or comprise[] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a
geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits,
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if they “comprise[] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”9
This
prohibition raises many questions. How is this provision of the Lanham
Act being applied in practice? Under what circumstances do examiners
decide that a mark is scandalous or immoral? What is the impact of
this provision on trademark owners? And what are the implications for
trademark law as a whole?
This project is the first of its kind. While much has been written
on the morality provisions in the Lanham Act, this piece is the first to
look behind the scenes and engage an empirical analysis of Section 2(a)
rejections based on scandalousness. This project looks in-depth at
trademarks that have received rejections based on their “scandalous”
nature. We look at which marks are being rejected, what evidence is
being used to reject them, and who the applicants are. We consider
whether this bar is effective at removing these “scandalous” marks from
the consumer marketplace. Our data pays particularly close attention to
the evidence used to support a refusal based on scandalousness.
Our analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses trademark
registration and the morality provisions generally. We discuss the
benefits of federal trademark registration, including the value of
registration to both trademark owners and the system itself. We also
discuss the development of the morality bars and their treatment in
scholarly literature. Many scholars have been critical of the morality
provisions both de jure and de facto, and solutions proposed in the
literature vary.10 In Part II, we explain our methodology and the process
by which we arrived at the data we present. Throughout the course of
our research, we analyzed 232 trademark records containing
applications that received a scandalousness refusal in either the first or
identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection
with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the
WTO Agreement (as defined in section 2(9) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
[19 U.S.C. §3501(9)]) enters into force with respect to the United States.
Id.
Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as
Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 214 (2007); Stephen R. Baird,
Moral Intervention in The Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and
Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 798 (1993); Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T.
Murphy, Calling Bulls**t on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and
Disparaging Marks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 468–82 (2011); Christine Haight Farley,
Stabilizing Morality in Trademark Law, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1019 (2014); Anne Gilson LaLonde
& Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1533–1534 (2011); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality:
Proposing Thin Protection of Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 71–
72, 74, 76 (2008); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and
“Scandalous” Trademarks Should be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 191, 209
(1996); Danwill Schwender, Congressional Trademark Delusion: Section 2(a) Expands The
Unclean Hands Doctrine Too Far, 48 IDEA 225, 245 (2008); Regan Smith, Trademark Law and
Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
451, 453 (2007).
9

10
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second Office Action, and gathered information about the applicants,
the marks, and the prosecution record. In Part III, we present our
findings. While scandalousness is given its meaning from the
perspective of a substantial composite of the general public in context of
the relevant marketplace for the applicant’s goods or services identified
in the application, trademark examiners often refuse applications by
reference to dictionary definitions alone.11 Our findings indicate that
the vast majority of Office Actions for refusals based on scandalousness
do not consider the context of the marketplace at all; our data also
indicate that context is the most common argument made by applicants
to refute a rejection. The absence of consideration of context is true
even for “niche” markets, such as adult entertainment. To the extent
that examiners address context, they generally use it only to support the
scandalous nature of the mark, rather than consider how context may
make a mark less scandalous: If a mark is used on “scandalous” goods
or services, that use reinforces the scandalous nature of the mark; if a
mark of questionable taste is used on general goods, it becomes more
scandalous in context. Furthermore, our data indicate that refusals and
approvals are highly inconsistent and unpredictable. We find that the
morality bars found in Section 2(a) have a disproportionate impact on
individuals and small businesses, which are the primary applicants for
such marks. These applicants are more likely to file applications pro se
and are less likely to file responses to Office Actions, choosing instead
(or by default) to simply abandon the application. Finally, most of these
marks are still in use, either by the applicant or by third parties, even
after refusal of registration, something that frustrates one of the key
purposes of the morality bar.
I. THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM AND MORALITY
Trademark law seeks to foster fair competition. As the federal
instrument of trademark law, the purpose of the Lanham Act is twofold; at its base, it is both a consumer protection mechanism and a
producer protection mechanism.12 It seeks to reduce consumer search
costs by assuring consumers that they are buying the goods they believe

See In re Blvd Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]n a case in which the
evidence shows that the mark has only one pertinent meaning, dictionary evidence alone can be
sufficient to satisfy the PTO’s burden.”).
12 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,1274 (“The
purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows,
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established rule of
law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.”).
11
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they are buying with the qualities they expect from a particular brand.13
Thus, it also incentivizes producers to invest time, money, and energy
into the quality of goods and services presented to the public under a
particular mark.14
A. Trademark Registration is Valuable Both to Trademark Owners and
to the Trademark System as a Whole
The federal registration system is a key element of brand strategy
for trademark owners. While common law trademark rights accrue
through use of the mark in commerce, federal registration of a
trademark provides additional substantive and procedural rights that are
unavailable to common law marks.15 Marks may be registered on either
the Principal or Supplemental Register.16 Federal registration on the
Principal Register confers the greatest benefit to a trademark owner. It
creates a statutory presumption that the trademark is valid, the registrant
is the owner of that mark, and that the registrant has the exclusive right
to use it on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the
registration.17 Registration on the Principal Register also serves as
constructive notice of a claim of ownership, eliminating third-party
defenses based on good faith adoption and use after the registration
date.18 Marks on the Principal Register also enjoy nationwide priority
Id. at 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275 (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of
competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trademarks encourage the maintenance of quality by
securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect
trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to
secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). But see McKenna, supra
note 2, at 1840–41 (arguing that trademark law was not traditionally intended to protect
consumers, and instead, “like all unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from
illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.”).
14 S. REP. NO. 79-1333. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1840–41.
15 Common law rights arise from use of a mark in commerce. Unregistered marks have limited
rights at common law and under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (establishing a
cause of action in Section 43(a) for infringement of unregistered marks). Additional rights
available to registered marks can be found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072.
16 Applicants must specify whether they are applying to register a mark on the Principal or
Supplemental Register If an applicant does not specify, the examining attorney will require the
applicant to amend the application to specify only one, or to file a request to divide the
application under 27 C.F.R. § 2.87. USPTO, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
(TMEP) § 801.02(b) (2015). If an applicant does not specify a particular register in an
application, the examiner will presume the applicant intends to apply for the Principal Register.
TMEP § 801.02(a); TMEP § 801.02(b); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091–1096.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register
provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of
the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services
specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.”).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this chapter or
under the Act of March 3, 1981, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall be constructive notice of
13
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in direct contrast to common law rights, which only extend to the
geographical reach of the market.19 They can become “incontestable”
after five years of continuous use, after which time they can only be
challenged on limited statutory grounds.20 And owners of marks on the
Principal Register can file the certificate of registration with the U.S.
Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods. 21
The Supplemental Register, on the other hand, is for registration of
marks that are not inherently distinctive and have not yet acquired
secondary meaning. While these marks are capable of distinguishing
the applicant’s goods or services, they do not yet signify in the minds of
the public a particular source of goods or services. While marks on the
Supplemental Register do not enjoy the full extent of benefits of those
registered on the Primary Register, it does enable use of the registered
trademark symbol, acts as a bar to registration of confusingly similar
marks, and may serve as the basis for an international trademark
application.22
B. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Bars Registration of Marks that are
Scandalous or Immoral
Section 2(a) bars registration of marks that are “scandalous” or
“immoral.”23 While scandalousness and immorality are not precisely
the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register
provided by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (“Except on a ground for which application to cancel may be filed at any
time under paragraphs (3) and (5) of section 1064 of this title, and except to the extent, if any, to
which the use of a mark registered on the principal register infringes a valid right acquired under
the law of any State or Territory . . . the right of the owner to use such registered mark in
commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been
in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still
in use in commerce, shall be incontestable.”).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the
name of any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader
located in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to
citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to
believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any
foreign country or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured,
shall be admitted to entry at any custom house of the United States . . . .”).
22 See TMEP §§ 815, 816 for procedures related to registration of marks on the Supplemental
Register. 15 U.S.C. §1094 (“The provisions of this chapter shall govern so far as applicable
applications for registration and registrations on the supplemental register as well as those on the
principal register, but applications for and registrations on the supplemental register shall not be
subject to or receive the advantages of sections 1051(b), 1052(e), 1052(f), 1057(b), 1057(c),
1062(a), 1063 to 1068, inclusive, 1072, 1115, and 1124 of this title.”).
23 The 1905 Trade-Mark Act was the first to ban trademarks of ill-repute. Trade-Mark Act of
1905 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1946) (repealed 1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1052
(2012)) (“That no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from
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synonymous, courts include immoral matter within the parameters of
scandalousness; there are no cases that directly and independently
consider immorality.24 Whether a mark is barred for moral reasons,
thus, is evaluated according to the ordinary and common meaning of the
word “scandalous” in 1938, when the provision was introduced.25
According to the 1938 dictionary, scandalous matter is “shocking to the
sense of propriety, offensive to the conscience or moral feelings or
calling out for condemnation.”26 During that period of time, it was
common to regulate content based on its scandalous nature. The
Motion Picture Production Code,27 also called the Hays Code,
prohibited a variety of content based on moral judgment, including
pointed profanity,28 miscegenation,29 revenge in modern times,30 and
dances that emphasize indecent movements.31 It further restricted
content by requiring particular care for subjects like methods of crime,32
sympathy for criminals,33 childbirth,34 and suggestive postures and
other goods of the same class shall be refused registration as a trade-mark on account of the
nature of such mark unless such mark [c]onsists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.”).
This prohibition was imported into the Lanham Act by Fritz Lanham, a Texas Congressman who
introduced the Act in 1938. In section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress has explicitly forbidden
registration for certain categories of marks including those that “[c]onsist[] of or comprise[]
immoral . . . or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .” 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a).
24 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981), aff’g 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (“Because of our holding, infra, that appellant’s mark is ‘scandalous,’ it is
unnecessary to consider whether appellant’s mark is ‘immoral.’ We note the dearth of reported
trademark decisions in which the term ‘immoral’ has been directly applied.”).
25 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
26 Id. at 328 (defining scandalous according to the Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary as
“1. Causing or tending to cause scandal; * * * shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable. * * *” and the 1932 Webster’s New International
Dictionary as “2. Giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; exciting reprobation; calling
out for condemnation. * * *” Most modern Office Action rejections based on scandalousness
repeat this language verbatim). See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486.
27 A CODE TO GOVERN THE MAKING OF TALKING AND MOTION PICTURES (Motion Pictures
Producers and Distributors of America, Inc. 1930) (“Motion picture producers . . . know that the
motion picture within its own field of entertainment may be directly responsible for spiritual or
moral progress, for higher types of social life, and for much correct thinking. During the rapid
transition from silent to talking pictures they have realized the necessity and the opportunity of
subscribing to a Code to govern the production of talking pictures and of re-acknowledging this
responsibility.”).
28 Id. ¶ V., (“Pointed profanity (this includes the words, God, Lord, Jesus, Christ - unless used
reverently - Hell, S.O.B., damn, Gawd), or every other profane or vulgar expression however
used, is forbidden.”).
29 Id. ¶ II(6). Incidentally, “white slavery” was also forbidden, but, notably, not black slavery.
Id. ¶ II(5).
30 Id. ¶ I(1)(c) (“Revenge in modern times shall not be justified.”).
31 Id. ¶ VII(2) (“Dances which emphasize indecent movements are to be regarded as obscene.”).
32 Id. ¶ I(2) (“Methods of crime should not be explicitly presented.”).
33 Id. ¶ I (Crimes against the law “shall never be presented in such a way as to throw sympathy
with the crime as against law and justice or to inspire others with a desire for imitation.”).
34 Id. ¶ II(8) (“Scenes of actual child birth, in fact or in silhouette, are never to be presented.”).
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gestures.35
While the Hays Code claimed a moral responsibility to bring
entertainment to a “higher level of wholesome[ness] . . . for all the
people,”36 the legislative history of the Lanham Act does not provide
insight into the purpose of the prohibition on scandalous trademarks.
Scholars generally speculate that reasons for the ban on registration of
these marks may include a desire to protect the public welfare and
morals, a government refusal to put an official imprimatur on marks that
are scandalous and immoral, and a position that the government should
not put resources into protecting marks of questionable taste.37
C. Morality Bars Have Been Criticized Across the Spectrum of
Intellectual Property
Although other forms of intellectual property, including copyright
and patent, have discriminated against works based on morality in the
past, there has been a trend towards eliminating restrictions based on
morality. In the past, copyright law contained bars to protection based
on morality, a restriction that has since been removed. While Congress
has generally construed the term “writings” in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution broadly to cover almost every type of literary
property, “obscene” works were denied copyright protection until fairly
recently.38 The modern view is to afford copyright protection to all
eligible works, regardless if a community regards a work as immoral or
obscene.39 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have expressly held that
obscene works are copyrightable, reasoning that the need for national
copyright protection outweighs the state and federal public policies
against obscenity.40 This is the approach taken by the Copyright Office
Id. ¶ II(2)(b) (“Excessive and lustful kissing, lustful embraces, suggestive postures and
gestures, are not to be shown.”)
36 Id. Preamble.
37 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468 (citing Baird, supra note 10, at 788).
38 See, Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (holding that works must be
“free from illegality or immorality” to obtain copyright protection); contra Mitchell Bros. Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)
(removing immoral standard).
39 See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.17
(“Mitchell expressly held that a work is not excluded from copyright protection by reasons of its
obscene content. This may be taken as the currently prevailing view, although in the past, a
number of courts took the view that obscene works are not eligible for copyright.”)
40 Jartech, Inc., v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982); Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at
862. In 1979, the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers that works could not be excluded from
copyright because of obscene content. In Mitchell Brothers, copyright owners of the adult film
Behind the Green Door brought an infringement suit against a group of theater owners showing
the film without permission. Defendants argued that the copyright holders brought suit with
“unclean hands,” and that equity should uphold obscenity as an affirmative defense to
infringement. The Fifth Circuit did not agree, rejecting the “moral conservator theory of copyright
invalidation,” the “property interest theory,” and the unclean hands equitable doctrine. The court
reasoned that Congress had intentionally omitted, and therefore did not intend, a bar for immoral
35
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today.
Patents were once invalidated based on a theory of moral utility,
requiring “ . . . the invention [to] not be frivolous or injurious to the well
being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”41 Under this definition,
“immoral” or “mischievous” inventions were not patentable because
those uses were not beneficial to society. The evolution to disregard
morality as a basis for patentability is well illustrated in the context of
gambling. In 1889, devices related to gambling were found to lack
utility, and thus were not patentable.42 However, an invention that was
solely used for gambling was granted a patent in 1977.43 In Ex parte
Murphy, the Board stated that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) “should not be the agency which seeks to enforce a
standard of morality with respect to gambling, by refusing, on the
ground of lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent.”44 The moral
utility theory has not been used since that time, a fact that has led
scholars to characterize it as a relic of the past.45
Many scholars have been critical of the morality provisions both
de jure and de facto, and proposed solutions vary.46 Critics of the bar

or obscene works. The court further argued that denying copyright to obscene works was contrary
to the Intellectual Property Clause’s purpose of promoting creativity, and reasoned that the
market was the appropriate arbitrator in determining if a work is fit for public consumption. The
Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Jartech, a case decided three years
after the Mitchell Brothers decision and the first major copyright-morality case under the
Copyright Act of 1976. The issue of copyrightability of obscene material has remained untouched
at the appellate level since Jartech.
41 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); Llewellyn Joseph
Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a)
Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 205 n.88 (2005).
42 Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (N.D. Ill. 1889).
43 Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802–803 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 1977).
44 Id. “While some may consider gambling to be injurious to the public morals and the good
order of society, we cannot find any basis in [35 U.S.C. 101] or related sections which justify a
conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable
utility.” Id.
45 Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 248 (2000). In the landmark case Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., the patent in question created the illusion that liquid was being dispensed from a
container above a spout when it was really pumped from a container hidden below the counter.
When Juicy Whip sued a competitor for infringement, the competitor claimed that the patent was
invalid because it lacked utility due to its deceptiveness. The district court found the patent
invalid because its purpose was to increase sales by deception, but the 2 nd Circuit reversed. The
court reasoned “the fact that one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a
specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.” The court subsequently
described several issued patents that had utility because they were designed to represent
something that they were not. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Band, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“ . . . but the principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed
to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years.”).
46 Abdel-Khalik, supra note 10, at 214; Baird, supra note 10, at 798; Farley, supra note 10;
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1533-34; Phillips, supra note 10, at 71–72, 74, 76; Reiter,
supra note 10, at 209; Schwender, supra note 10, at 245; Smith, supra note 10, at 453. .
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have accused it of being ineffective, inconsistent, and possibly illegal.47
Several scholars have questioned whether the bar has been at all
effective in removing offensive trademarks from the marketplace, or
whether it has merely removed them from the screen of the federal
register.48 Furthermore, inconsistencies exist in the application of the
bar, both internally and with regard to the basic purpose and function of
trademark law.49 Scholars have also considered whether the provision
violates the First Amendment protections of the U.S. Constitution.50
Even defenders of the provision have suggested solutions to “fix” the
problems presented by the bar.51 Proposed solutions include eliminating
the terms “scandalous” and “immoral” from the statute altogether,
amending the statute to provide more specificity, and devising new
procedures to better effectuate the object and purpose of the bars.52
In this paper, we do not seek to solve the problems presented by
the morality bars found in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Rather, we
recognize that in order to be effective, the first step to any solution is to
seek a thorough understanding of the depth and breadth of the problem
itself. Accordingly, this paper presents an empirical analysis of the
application of the scandalousness bar.
II. METHODOLOGY
We examined an original dataset of 232 trademark records
containing a Section 2(a) refusal based on scandalousness and
immorality for applications filed between 2001 and 2011. Because the
USPTO’s database does not enable searches by grounds for refusal of a
particular mark, based on previous research and study we used the
USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System (“TESS”) to search for
marks containing terms that would likely meet trademark examiners’
criteria for a Section 2(a) refusal on these grounds. Once we identified
salient terms for particular refusals, we searched for a sample of
additional marks containing those terms, and extrapolated to additional
related marks across the broad spectrum of categories for refusal
outlined by Gilson and LaLonde: profanity; sex; violence; disability;
ethnicity; religion; politics; and scatology.53
We reviewed the life cycle of the trademark application in its
entirety for each mark, from application through either final refusal or
Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10.
Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468–73; LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1534.
49 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468–73; LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1534.
50 See Baird, supra note 10, at 661; Smith, supra note 10, at 451.
51 See, e.g., Farley, supra 10, at 101.
52 See Abdel-Khalik supra note 10 (arguing for a two-tiered approach to determine whether a
mark is scandalous); Reiter, supra note 10; Schwender, supra note 10 (arguing that the market
should be sufficient to weed out objectionable marks).
53 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1510–30.
47
48
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registration, in an effort to examine how trademark applications are
being analyzed based on this particular provision of Section 2(a). Our
dataset includes a variety of information about the applicants, the marks
themselves, and the goods/services identified in the application. It also
includes an analysis of any Office Actions issued by the USPTO,
including grounds for refusal, evidence presented, and explicit
reasoning of the examining attorney. It includes information about any
Office Action responses filed on behalf of the applicant, including rate
of response and arguments submitted, as well as the final dispensation
of the application.
When analyzing the USPTO record for each mark, we looked at
each Office Action issued and the applicant’s responses, where
applicable.54 In order to determine whether context was used in an
examiner’s evaluation of a particular application, we considered
whether the examiner or applicant referred specifically to the goods, the
marketplace those goods are or would be sold in, internet evidence such
as computer filters or search results, the visual context of the mark
itself, alternate meanings of the word(s), and any evidence the word is
or is not scandalous in society, as well as other individual arguments as
raised by the applicants or examiner.55 We did not count third-party
registrations and refusals as a contextual factor, although applicants
frequently used this information as an argument in support of
registration.56
In order to assess inconsistencies between or within the disposition
of applications by the USPTO, we also did a “deep-dive” into a few
specific terms for which marks were rejected by examiners. These
terms include: BITCH, POTHEAD, SHIT, SLUT, and WHORE. We
selected these marks based on identified inconsistencies in the dataset.
For these terms, to provide a representative sample we searched all
marks containing those terms, and selected marks identified by the
Basic Index field of the Structured Search engine of the TESS of the
USPTO with an application date of even years during the selected
research period.57 Where there were more than thirty-five such marks
for each year, we only reviewed the first thirty-five listed. For these
marks, we reviewed all trademark proceedings from application through
to registration or final refusal.

There are a few marks where the USPTO record is incomplete, consisting solely of a
registration certificate. See, e.g., KICK ASS LIMITED, Registration No. 2,039,645.
55 This included evidence such as internet searches, articles, other media using the word, and
FCC rulings and standards. For applicants, we also considered arguments such as that the mark
was self-referential, regulations, and the consumer market. See infra Part III.A–B.
56 Though the presence in the marketplace of other marks with similar words would be relevant,
registration is not required to use a mark and thus not a contextual factor at issue in those
situations.
57 The years included 2000; 2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; and 2010.
54
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In addition to an examination of the trademark records, we sought
to obtain additional information about post-registration use of marks
that received a final refusal. For each rejected mark, we performed an
internet search in an effort to determine whether the mark was still in
use, and, if so, whether the original applicant was the one (or one of the
ones) using that mark.58
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Scandalousness is to be Determined in the Context of the
Marketplace, yet Most Refusals Fail to Consider Context of any Kind
The determination of whether a mark is scandalous must be made
in the context of current attitudes of the day. 59 A trademark is
scandalous or immoral in context of the relevant marketplace for the
applicant’s goods or services identified in the application.60 Those
attitudes must be ascertained from the standpoint of a “substantial
composite of the general public,” not necessarily a majority. 61 Thus, in
summary, the relevant inquiry is whether a substantial composite of the
general public would find the mark scandalous in the context of that
particular marketplace in contemporary society.
However, over 73% of refusals issued by examiners on the
grounds of scandalousness failed to discuss context of any kind,
including the context of the relevant marketplace for the goods and
services identified in the application. Though nearly a quarter of the
applications we reviewed were targeted at niche markets, the fact that a
particular mark was intended for a niche, rather than a general, market
did not appear to weigh significantly in the calculation of whether a
trademark application was rejected or approved for publication. While
the marketplace is a key aspect of the legal standard, it did not
significantly impact the rates of refusal.

While we were unable to obtain information about every mark, where we were able to locate
the mark, the information obtained was notable. See infra Part III.G.
59 In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481,
485 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996); Greyhound
Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988); TMEP § 1203.01.
60 TMEP § 1203.01; In re Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1371; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485.
61 In re Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1372–74 (noting the dearth of evidence before the court
demonstrating which of multiple definitions of “tail” would be best understood by a substantial
composite of the general public); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485; In re Old Glory Condom
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (finding that a design mark of a condom decorated
with stars and stripes in an manner to suggest the American flag was not scandalous where it was
presented in a patriotic and positive way); In re Thomas Laboratories, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 50, 52
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (“[I]t is imperative that fullest consideration be given to the moral values and
conduct which contemporary society has deemed to be appropriate and acceptable.”).
58

Carpenter & Garner – NSFW: Scandalous Trademarks

2015]

NSFW: SCANDALOUS TRADEMARKS

335

The visual context of the mark itself was also often not addressed,
unless either brought up by the applicant or when it served to reinforce
the examiner’s viewpoint of the vulgarity of the words in the mark.
Overall, out of 53 marks with visual context to consider, the examiner
was the first to reference this context in only 43% of these marks.62 The
applicant argued visual context for the first time in 13% of these
marks,63 and in the remaining 43%, visual context was not addressed at
all by either the applicant or the examiner.
If the USPTO examining attorneys fail to address context, which is
a material part of the legal standard, what evidence is being used to
refuse registrations based on scandalousness/immorality? The term
“scandalous” has been held to encompass matter that is merely
“vulgar.”64 Evidence of the opinions of a substantial composite of the
general public can include media, including magazine articles,
newspaper articles, and dictionary definitions.65 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit has held that dictionary definitions alone can be
sufficient to establish scandalousness where multiple dictionaries
indicate a word is vulgar and the applicant’s mark indicates the vulgar
meaning of the word.66
The examiner referenced visual context first in 43.4% of the marks. In 37.74% of marks with
visual context, the examiner addressed such context in the initial Office Action. In 5.66%, the
examiner brought up visual context for the first time in the second Office Action.
63 13.21% of marks with visual context, constituting seven of the 53 marks which had visual
context.
64 Vulgar has been defined as “lacking in taste, indelicate, morally crude.” In re Runsdorf, 171
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
65 TMEP § 1203.01.
66 The applicant’s use must be limited to the vulgar meaning of the word. See In re Blvd Entm’t,
62
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Trademark examiners are under pressure to meet high quarterly
quotas of “balanced disposals” of applications.67 Balanced disposals are
credits that examiners are given as they complete work or take action on
the total number of classes within a trademark application.68 Quotas are
based on the attorney’s grade level and quarterly production
requirements. An examiner’s performance is evaluated based on
quantity and quality according to the terms of the USPTO Performance
Appraisal Plan.69 To be “fully successful,” examining attorneys at a GS
9/11/2 ranking must have from 425–549 Balanced Disposals per
quarter.70 To be designated as “outstanding,” the attorney must have
completed at least 515–75 balanced disposals.71 Aside from the
quarterly quotas, examiners are under additional time pressures. For
example, examiners are asked to complete examination of all new
applications, including search of the mark and preparing an Office
Action or a Notice of Allowance, within seven calendar days of
receipt.72
1. Dictionary Definitions were the Primary Evidence Used to Support a
Refusal Based on Scandalousness
Where a particular mark contains words that are listed as “vulgar”
in the dictionary, it may be the most expedient—and logical—course of
action for an examiner to use dictionary definitions to quickly dictate
acceptance or rejection of a mark. Examining attorneys under pressure
to process applications quickly can either ascertain the meaning of a
mark in the context of current attitudes of the day, which is the legal
standard, or they can do a quick dictionary search and reject an

334 F.3d 1336, 1340–43 (Fed Cir. 2003) (1-800-JACK-OFF and JACK OFF were scandalous
where multiple dictionary definitions indicated the term “jack off” was vulgar).
67 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL P LAN, available at http://www.nteu245.org/GS-9-1112PAP.PDF;
GS
13/14
PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL
PLAN,
available
at
http://www.nteu245.org/PAP13-14.pdf.
68 Examiners take one action for completing an initial examination and making a determination
regarding the registrability of the mark or “first action” on an application, and one for either
approving an application for publication or abandonment.
69 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL P LAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67.
70 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL P LAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67. See also MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
UNION, Chapter 245 TM GS-9/11/12 Performance Appraisal Plan, available at
http://www.nteu245.org/GS-9-11-12PAPMOU.pdf.
71 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL P LAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67.
72 For amended applications, the examiner must review the application and take appropriate
action within 21 calendar days. For applications returned for correction, the attorney advisor
takes appropriate action within 7 calendar days. For applications returned for abandonment, the
attorney advisor takes appropriate action within 14 calendar days. GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 69; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 69.
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application if it contains a word that is listed as “vulgar.” It is no
wonder that the vast majority of applications that are rejected for
scandalousness are rejected based on the fact that they contain a word
that is listed as “vulgar” in the dictionary.

Of the records we reviewed, dictionary definitions were used as a
primary source of support for a rejection based on scandalousness 91%
of the time. Examiners used only the dictionary, without any other
contextual information, as supporting evidence in 70% of Office
Actions.73 Public or crowd-sourced dictionaries were used in 27% of all
rejections based on scandalousness.74
2. The Use of Dictionary Definitions in the Abstract to Support a
Refusal was Consistent Across Marketplaces, Including Niche Markets
The tendency of a trademark examiner to rely on dictionary
definitions as the exclusive or primary evidence for a rejection based on
scandalousness is consistent across diverse marketplaces. Though, on
the face of the applications we reviewed, the bulk of marks are targeted
for a general market, nearly a quarter (20%) of applications reviewed
were explicitly targeted for niche markets, such as adult entertainment
or adult-oriented goods.
Even within the narrow context of those niche markets, dictionary
definitions figured as primary evidence in refusals based on
162 Office Actions used only the dictionary as evidence for a rejection based on
scandalousness. This is over three-quarters (76.78%) of the times that dictionaries are used as
supporting evidence.
74 Public or crowd-sourced dictionaries include dictionaries such as Urban Dictionary.
73
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scandalousness 91% of the time. Of those rejections, dictionary
definitions served as the only evidence used in over half (53%) of the
refusals. Evidence regarding the narrowness of the marketplace did not
appear to be considered, except to reinforce a scandalousness rejection.

B. When Examiners do Consider the Context of the Marketplace, They
Often do so as an Argument Against Registration
While examiners consider contextual information only
infrequently, when they do consider context of the marketplace they
often do so as an argument against registration.75 This is the case
whether or not the marketplace is a niche or general market. The
consideration of context appears to be a Catch-22: If the marketplace is
of an “adult” nature, that fact is used against the applicant as evidence
that a scandalous meaning is intended by the mark. If the marketplace
is a general consuming market, the examiner often rejects the mark
because a questionable mark is especially scandalous in a general
marketplace.
1. Use of a Mark in an Adult-Oriented Marketplace is Frequently Used
as Evidence That the Mark Itself is Scandalous or Immoral
To the extent that examiners consider marketplace context, an
adult-oriented marketplace may be used as evidence that the mark itself
is scandalous or immoral.76 Examiners frequently reason that marks
Of marks targeted at niche markets, only five Office Actions referenced context of the market
at all.
76 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5, 2005)
75
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applied to specific adult marketplaces reinforce the assertion that those
terms are scandalous or vulgar.77 For example, the marks TOKYO
CREAMPIE and GAYFACIALSXXX were marketed and used in niche
markets, such as an adult website. However, the very fact that the marks
were used in those markets was supporting evidence that the general
public would be scandalized, because usage in that context makes it
clear that the marks reference sexually explicit material.78 This is the
case even with regard to marks in narrow and specific markets; while
the applicant for POST-TITS asserted that the relevant market was
controlled and narrow, the examiner reasoned that the market was
irrelevant because the general public would find the mark scandalous.79
Sometimes, this is the case irrespective of what is contained in the
application.80 In these situations, context is used only to reinforce the
vulgar or scandalous meaning. However, a proper evaluation considers
whether a substantial composite of the general public would find the
(FUCK.XXX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006)
(BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug.
17, 2005) (BIGCOCKSEX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24,
2005) (COPYCOCK.XXX).
77 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006)
(BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug.
24, 2005) (COPYCOCK.XXX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,586,759 (filed Mar.
14, 2005) (YOU COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug. 17,
2005) (BIGCOCKSEX).
78 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO
CREAMPIE) (Third Office Action dated Feb. 2, 2004); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,788,383 (filed Jan. 10, 2006) (GAYFACIALSXXX) (Office Action dated July 15, 2006).
79 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (Office Action dated
May 20, 2004).
80 See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,853,993 (filed Apr. 4, 2006) (TITTY
CITY) (claiming services in class 41 for “entertainment”); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011) (FAT COCK BEER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
76,490,572 (filed Feb. 19, 2003) (JAPANESE CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 76,639,548 (filed May 25, 2005) (NIGGA); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) (THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007) (TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008) (COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006) (COCAINE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639
(filed Feb. 28, 2007) (COCAINE CUT THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1, 2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL
ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005)
(METH); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006) (BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A
GIRL); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T
D*N’T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,222 (filed Oct. 24, 2008)
(SHAKE THOSE TITTIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9,
2001) (SHITBEGONE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005)
(“TALKING COCK”).
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mark scandalous in the context of that particular marketplace.81 It is a
tautology to reason that a mark is scandalous simply because it is used
in a specific channel of trade that involves sexually explicit goods or
services; yet that is a common argument in scandalousness refusals
when the mark is to be used in an “adult” marketplace.82
2. Use of a Mark in a General Marketplace is Frequently Used as
Evidence That the Mark Itself is Scandalous or Immoral
Most often, the marketplace is abstracted from the analysis
entirely, and the examiner focuses on whether a substantial composite
of the general public would find the mark scandalous, with any
marketplace analysis going to support that argument. When they do
consider market context, examining attorneys often consider a more
general marketplace abstracted from the particular goods or services at

See In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660
F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1930-32
(TTAB 1996); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1639 (TTAB
1988); TMEP § 1203.01.
82 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24, 2005)
(COPYCOCK.XXX) (Third Office Action dated Mar. 12, 2007) (use in connection with the
goods clearly refers to erotic meanings, reinforcing vulgarity); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug. 17, 2005) (BIGCOCKSEX) (because the mark is applied in a specific
marketplace—adult entertainment—it reinforces the vulgarity); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006) (BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS) (because the mark is
applied to a specific marketplace—sexually explicit services such as web sites containing adult
entertainment—and uses that to reinforce assertion that the terms “cock” and “slut” are
scandalous or vulgar); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,586,759 (filed Mar. 14, 2005)
(YOU COCK) (use of mark in the field of adult entertainment services reinforces the vulgar
meaning). See also U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003)
(TOKYO CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,490,572 (filed Feb. 19, 2003)
(JAPANESE CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,639,548 (filed May 25,
2005) (NIGGA); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007)
(THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007)
(TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008)
(COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011)
(SOCK MY COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006)
(COCAINE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639 (filed Feb. 28, 2007)
(COCAINE CUT THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1, 2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (METH); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006) (BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T D*N’T
STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,222 (filed Oct. 24, 2008) (SHAKE
THOSE TITTIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 2001)
(SHITBEGONE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005)
(“TALKING COCK”). One Office Action reasoned precisely to the contrary, claiming that if the
proposed mark were analyzed in reference to the relevant market base, the mark wouldn’t fail
because applicants would not tend to adopt marks that would drive away relevant purchasers.
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5, 2005) (FUCK.XXX).
81
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issue. Google searches are a common contextual piece of evidence used
to demonstrate that a mark is scandalous to the general public.83 For
instance, in the case of FAT COCK BEER, though the applicant
submitted a preliminary label to clarify the meaning of the mark, the
examiner stated that “fat cock” is vulgar slang according to a Google
search and the mark was therefore scandalous to the general public.84
Likewise, TITTY PRETTIES was determined to be scandalous based in
part on a Google search showing that the word “titty” can be used in an
“offensive and disgraceful manner.”85 Even for marks that are intended
for a niche market, this sort of abstract marketplace context is applied.86
Perhaps because of a lack of clarity as to the proper procedure for
trademark examiners, there are inconsistencies in reasoning across
refusals. In at least one instance, the examiner reasoned that a refusal
was warranted because scandalous information would be found while
searching for the stated vulgar terms on the internet, rather than the
reverse, that the mark would be found while searching in general
commerce.87 The examiner went on to state that the relevant audience
is irrelevant to an analysis of whether a mark is scandalous or immoral
because that would help people attempting to register such marks. 88
The examiner reasoned that if the appropriate test were put in context of
the “relevant population” no mark would ever be refused on Section
2(a) grounds “since the applicant would not adopt a mark which [sic]
would drive the relevant purchasers or audience away from using or
purchasing the applicant’s identified goods or services.”89
C. When Examiners Consider the Context of Goods and Services, They
Often do so as an Argument Against Registration
Our research yielded similar findings with regard to goods and
services. Examiners are generally unlikely to consider goods and
services in Office Actions issued under Section 2(a). When they do, the
argument is similarly circular: Goods or services that are adult-oriented
22.58% of the time search engine results (Google, Yahoo!, etc.) are used to indicate public
opinion of the relevant term.
84 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011).
85 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,524,781(filed Nov. 30, 2004) (Office Action dated
July 11, 2005).
86 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,218,607 (filed Feb. 25, 2003) (CLITS
AND TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,519,589 (filed Nov. 18, 2004)
(COOCHIE SMOOCHIE).
87 The examiner states that websites are ubiquitous and can be accessed by anyone, and notes that
the attorney found several other scandalous sites while searching for the term “fuckxxx.” The
examiner uses this to support the proposition that anyone may come across these goods and
services, but does not seem to take into consideration that s/he was specifically searching for the
term “fuckxxx” on the internet. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5,
2005) (FUCK.XXX).
88 Id.
89 Id.
83
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will be used to support a scandalousness refusal on the idea that those
particular goods and services remove doubt as to the vulgar meaning of
the mark. Conversely, where the goods themselves are not scandalous,
the nature of the goods or services is either ignored or used to support
the argument that the mark is vulgar; an offensive mark on inoffensive
goods is especially scandalous.
1. Use of a Mark on Adult-Oriented Goods is Frequently Used as
Evidence That the Mark is Scandalous
As with the marketplace, when the specific goods are referenced
by the examiner, it is generally used to support an assertion that the
goods reinforce, or at least do not rebut, the vulgarity. Specifically, if
the goods or services are adult-oriented rather than something that
would be for sale in a more general market, that supports the vulgarity
aspect because, by removing doubt as to the vulgar meaning, the general
public will be scandalized.90
See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,639,658 (filed May 30, 2005) (DO THE
JEW) (similar goods, not necessarily applicant’s); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
76,415,493 (filed Apr. 29, 2002) (COOCHIECALENDAR); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) (THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007) (TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,864,664 (filed Apr. 19, 2006) (MR. HORSE COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,416,780 (filed May 11, 2004) (BLOW JOB BUBBLE GUM); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78,416,796 (filed May 11, 2004) (THE ORIGINAL BLOW JOB GUM); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,522,412 (filed July 15, 2008) (HUMP!); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 76,511,051 (filed May 2, 2003) (C P CREAM PIE); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008) (COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 77,745,550 (filed May 27, 2009) (RIDE HARD RETARD); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,128,286 (filed Mar. 12, 2007) (TITTY TV); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,788,383 (filed Jan. 10, 2006) (GAYFACIALSXXX); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed July 7, 2005) (SCHLONG WEAR); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,784,737 (filed Jan. 4, 2006) (HISFIRSTHUGECOCK);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,879,965 (filed May 9, 2006) (TIT-MITT); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008) (BEAVERSHAVER); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY COCK); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,866,123 (filed Nov. 5, 2009) (DOUCHEBAG AWARD);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (“TALKING COCK”);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006) (COCAINE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639 (filed Feb. 28, 2007) (COCAINE CUT THE
LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1,
2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (METH); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,038,867
(filed May 14, 2010) (KO KANE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan.
5, 2006) (BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775
(filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed
Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,168,702 (filed Nov. 3, 2010)
(FUCK MEAT); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,643,745 (filed Jan. 6, 2009) (SHITKICKERS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,082,839 (filed July 12, 2010) (BONER
BIBLE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T
D*N’T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,866,347 (filed Apr. 20, 2006)
(FUGLY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH
YOUR TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,135,356 (filed Jun. 13, 2002) (NICE
90
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This is particularly common where the goods in question are adult
videos. For the mark MR. HORSE COCK, the examiner noted that the
wording clearly referred to the subject matter of the movies and was
“thus . . . shocking to a substantial composite of the general public.”91
Similarly, the fact that the videotapes intended to be sold under the
mark JAPANESE CREAMPIE would depict sexual acts meant they
would be “morally crude” to the general public.92 Non-video goods
received this treatment as well, such as the product under the mark
TALKING COCK. Because the product itself would make what the
examiner stated were vulgar statements, this reinforced the
offensiveness of the mark.93
2. Use of a Mark on Goods Oriented to the General Public is Frequently
Used as Evidence That the Mark is Scandalous
Even where the goods themselves are not necessarily scandalous
alone, they are used to reinforce the vulgarity of the mark. For
example, the mark TIT-MITT was rejected in part because the use of
the word “tit” on bras would ensure people know that the word “tit” was
used in reference to a woman’s breast.94 In another instance, though
SCHLONG WEAR95 is for clothing and is a spin-off brand of
SCHLONGBOARDS,96 the goods were ignored in favor of the slang
meaning of the word “schlong” and the potentially vulgar nature of the
mark’s design.97 Similarly, MY SH!T D*N’T STINK is a mark for a
deodorizer to be used by hikers and other participants in outdoors
activities. 98 Despite the non-scandalous nature of the goods, the
examiner reasoned that use of the word “shit” rendered the mark vulgar
even if the term is relevant and not being used in the vulgar sense. 99
Our research uncovered similar reasoning in refusals for marks TOUCH
YOUR TITS for shirts100 and TITTIGYM for an adult health and fitness
TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,853,993 (filed Apr. 4, 2006) (TITTY CITY);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009) (HAND JOB); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 2001) (SHITBEGONE).
91 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,864,664 (filed Apr. 19, 2006) (Office Action dated
Sept. 26, 2006).
92 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,490,572 (filed Jun. 4, 2003) (Office Action dated
Aug. 15, 2003).
93 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78716443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (Office Action
dated Apr. 3, 2006).
94 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,879,965 (filed May 9, 2006).
95 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed July 7, 2005).
96 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,371,260 (filed Feb. 20, 2004).
97 Applicant’s additional information regarding what the final mark would look like, particularly
in the addition of color to emphasize that a monkey in the mark is holding a banana, and a slightly
edited version of the mark which also served to clarify its non-scandalous nature were rejected by
the examiner. See id. (Paper Correspondence Incoming dated Apr. 11, 2006).
98 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005).
99 Id. (Office Action dated Aug. 2, 2006).
100 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009).
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club.101 Because TOUCH YOUR TITS was used on shirts, for example,
the examiner stated that the goods only reinforced the vulgar meaning
by ensuring consumers realize that breasts are the intended meaning of
the word.102
On some occasions, the applicant’s goods were specifically
mentioned but not elaborated on as to whether or how they support a
finding of a Section 2(a) refusal.103 There were also a few situations in
which, although there was nothing that indicated whether the goods
would be sexual on the face of the application, the examiner inferred
scandalousness by relating the salient portions of the mark with and
how it may be applied to the goods in question. This occurred with both
TITTIGYM104 for an adult health and fitness club services and TITTY
TV105 for caps, shirts, shorts, and undergarments.
D. Examiners Often Acknowledge the Relevance of Context de jure, but
Disregard it de facto
Examiners often acknowledge the relevance of context in
particular Office Actions, but proceed to disregard that context in
subsequent refusals. This frequently occurred with regard to profanity.
In a significant number of rejections, examiners (1) cited the rule that
trademarks must be evaluated in the context of current attitudes; (2)
noted that profanity was more common in current society; and then (3)
concluded that acceptance of profanity makes words no less profane.106
The examiner then rejected the marks without any additional supporting
evidence.107 This occurred for marks containing 11 terms out of the 40
we investigated. These 11 words account for 125 total records in the
dataset,108 and this reasoning was present in a majority of all rejections
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007). See also, U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77866123 (filed Nov. 5, 2009) (DOUCHEBAG AWARD)
(stating that because the mark is clearly not referencing the personal hygiene meaning of the
word, use of the mark with those goods supports the vulgar meaning).
102 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH YOUR
TITS).
103 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,090,708 (filed Jan. 25, 2007) (STFU);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,519,589 (filed Nov. 18, 2004) (COOCHIE
SMOOCHIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,402,917 (filed Feb. 21, 2008) (BAD
ASS MOTHER FUCKER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,471,577 (filed Aug. 22,
2004) (I’VE HAD IT UP TO TIKRIT WITH THIS SHIT); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,502,095 (filed Oct. 19, 2004) (IT DON’T MEAN SHIT); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 76,626,410 (filed Dec. 28, 2004) (FUCK YOU); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 85,268,293 (filed Mar. 16, 2011) (SHITSHOOTER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,735,840 (filed Oct. 18, 2005) (RETARDS GONE WILD); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,750,245 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (COOCHIE CUSHION).
104 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007).
105 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,128,286 (filed Mar. 12, 2007).
106 In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
107 58.4%.
108 These terms also account for over half of the records in the dataset: 53.88%.
101
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based on those terms.109 Several of these words are in marks that have
also been registered.110

E. This Mischaracterization of the Law Has a Real Impact on the
Trademark Registration Process
According to our research, initial refusals based on scandalousness
are statistically much less likely to result in ultimate registrations than
refusals based on other grounds. The overall success rate for a response
to an Office Action, when represented by an attorney, was 72%. 111 That
rate dropped to 45%112 for pro se applicants. However, in our data, the
success rate was less than 5%, significantly lower than either success
rate and particularly significant given the applicants in our data were
both represented by attorneys. Furthermore, applicants are unlikely to
respond to Office Actions based on scandalousness. This may be
because the majority of applicants in these situations are individuals and
small businesses, because there are higher-than-average rates of pro se
applicants for these marks, and/or because the lack of clear legal
standards for examiners makes it too difficult for applicants to
overcome refusals. Data on each of these issues are presented below.

58.4%. The words that received that treatment were FUCK, SHIT, ASSHOLE, TITS, CUM,
DOUCHEBAG, MILF, NIGGER/BLACK, BITCH, CUNT, AND BEAVER.
110 For example, MILF, BEAVER, and TITS.
111 Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 583, 616 (2013).
112 Id.
109
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1. Refusals Based on Scandalousness Disproportionately Impact
Individuals and Small Businesses
Over 97% of all applications in the dataset were filed by
individuals and small businesses. Though there were two applications
where the legal entity is unknown,113 only one applicant, Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. (TBS), was clearly in possession of
significant resources, such as money and access to legal support, as a
Fortune 500 company.

2. Applicants are Unlikely to Respond to a Refusal Based on
Scandalousness
According to our research, applicants are unlikely to respond to a
refusal based on scandalousness, and instead let the mark go abandoned.
Of those that responded, the applicants were evenly split between
smaller businesses and individuals at 23 each (49%). The final
respondent was an unknown legal entity. However, given the larger
overall number of applicants that were individuals, there appears to be a
smaller chance that an individual will respond. Only 17% of
individuals filed a response to an Office Action, as compared with 24%
of small businesses. Even so, applicants are highly unlikely overall to
respond when their proposed mark is rejected for being scandalous or
immoral.

Per the USPTO information. See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 79,014,488
(filed Aug. 18, 2005) (COCK & BALLS IT’S JUST WRONG); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 76,663,546 (filed July 24, 2006) (CUM PARTAY).
113
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This low probability of response may be related to the high
number of applicants who are not represented by an attorney. Of the
marks rejected for being scandalous or immoral, 75%114 of applicants
filed their trademark applications pro se. Both of the marks that
ultimately overcame the scandalousness rejection were filed by
applicants represented by an attorney. In contrast, of the approved
marks, the numbers are reversed with 79% being represented by
attorneys and only 21% filing pro se.115

Applicants responded to an Office Action containing a rejection on
scandalous or immoral grounds less than one-quarter of the time. There
was no response to 80% of rejections, thus resulting in abandonment of
the mark. Applicants represented by an attorney were more likely to
respond to a rejection.116 However, even when there was a response to
the rejection, only twice in our dataset was that response successful in
overcoming the scandalousness argument. This number constitutes
fewer than five percent117 of all responses, with the other nearly 96%118
failing in their challenge. Of responses that failed, only five of them
(10%119) were appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”).

74.57%.
78.95% of approved marks were represented by an attorney, contrasted with 21.05% that were
pro se.
116 57.45% of applicants who responded were represented by an attorney as compared to 42.55%
of respondents who were acting pro se.
117 4.26%.
118 95.74%.
119 10.42%.
114
115
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3. When Applicants Do Respond, They Argue Contextual Factors
When applicants did respond, most frequently applicants argued a
variety of contextual factors to show that the mark was not scandalous
and that those factors supported registration of the mark. A contextual
argument was made in 64% of all responses, and was the most common
argument presented by trademark owners.

The individual arguments regarding context ranged from the very
specific to more general arguments regarding overall attitudes of
society. The most common argument in rebutting a rejection for
scandalousness was that a particular term had alternate meanings. An
argument for alternate meanings of the mark in question was advanced
in 32%120 of Office Action responses. The next most common
argument was that the word was not scandalous in the context of the
marketplace. This type of argument was advanced in just over 25%121
of responses to a rejection. This included arguments both regarding the
specific location where the goods were sold, such as regulated shops or
adult markets,122 and also that the mark wasn’t scandalous in the context
of the specific goods, such as on shirts being sold by PETA. 123 Visual
context, while not brought up often by the applicant, appeared to be the
most effective argument; in fact, it was the sole argument that overcame

31.91%.
25.53%.
122 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POSTTITS).
123 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,168,702 (filed Nov. 3, 2010) (FUCK MEAT).
120
121
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a rejection for scandalousness.124

It is very difficult to overcome a Section 2(a) refusal based on
scandalousness. While contextual factors were the most frequently
argued rebuttal, those arguments were only successful in two of the 232
records we reviewed. More frequently, if the examiner then considered
context, such argument was used against the applicant. The applicant in
the case of “TALKING COCK,” for example, specifically pointed out
that there are regulations in place to ensure products of an adult nature,
such as the ones at issue, are adequately separated from the general
population, and particularly from children.125
This information
regarding the specific marketplace for the good in question was,
however, not addressed or rebutted in the examiner’s subsequent Office
Action. Instead, the examiner copied verbatim the original arguments
against the product: that the illustrations depicted the word in a vulgar
fashion and the product made vulgar statements.126 No further
elaboration on the arguments was made, nor were the applicant’s
arguments addressed. This example is typical of the dataset.
In the case of the mark, WHITE ASS, the applicant pointed out the ears and tail adorning the
“A” of the mark, indicating the reference to a donkey rather than a more vulgar usage of the word
“ass.” U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (Response to
Office Action dated May 23, 2011). In the case of FUGLY FRUITS, the applicant pointed to the
“playful stylized form of the mark” to show that there would not be a potential perception that the
word “fugly” meant “fucking ugly.” U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,736,643 (filed
Oct. 19, 2005) (FUGLY FRUITS) (Response to Office Action dated May 25, 2006).
125 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (Response to Office
Action dated Oct. 2, 2006).
126 Id. (Office Action dated Dec. 21, 2007).
124
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Of the trademark records reviewed, only two responses were
effective in convincing the trademark examiner to withdraw his or her
Section 2(a) refusal, and in both cases the applicant argued context.127
In fact, with those two exceptions, in none of the examined files was the
mark approved by the examiner based on contextual factors. Rather,
where the applicant argued context, the examiner often used that context
to reinforce the scandalousness of the mark instead of withdrawing the
Section 2(a) rejection, or disregarded the contextual argument entirely.
Even when the examiner was the first to address the context of the
mark, this context was used only to bolster the argument that the mark
was scandalous or immoral. Some of the more common arguments
beyond the broad argument of alternate meanings or general context are
that the mark is intended to be humorous or a double entendre, that the
mark was not scandalous in context of visual imagery, or that there are
third-party registrations already approved by the USPTO containing the
same material terms.
a. Double Entendre
Several applicants argued that their mark was intentionally
humorous or a double entendre, thus mitigating or eliminating any
scandalous meaning. This argument does not appear to be accepted as a
reason to find something non-scandalous. Often, the double entendre
appears not to be considered at all as contributing to the overall
commercial impression of the mark, even if raised by the applicant. In
cases where the entire phrase had a vulgar meaning, even if it was not
intended or used in that fashion, the examiner stated that the vulgar
meaning of the phrase is what matters rather than the potential doubleentendre, despite possible visual context or other evidence showing the
non-vulgar meaning.
For example, the mark HAND JOB contains a clear subtitle of
“Nails & Spa” on the logo. Despite this, the examiner stated that
because “hand job” as a phrase has no non-vulgar meaning, the play on
words was not persuasive.128 This is despite the applicant pointing out
that taken as individual words in combination with the subtitle, “hand
job” can have a meaning that is not vulgar. Similarly, FAT COCK

Because of the vague standard and the little evidence required to sustain a rejection for
scandalousness (dictionary definitions), it is very difficult for applicants to overcome a rejection
on this basis in the registration process. The only marks that have overcome a rejection based on
scandalousness are WHITE ASS, and FUGLY FRUITS. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,736,643 (filed Oct. 19, 2005) (FUGLY FRUITS). PHAG was initially rejected and
abandoned, but when revived went through with no apparent rejection. Registration No.
4,135,694. The applications for WHITE ASS and FUGLY were later abandoned for other
reasons.
128 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009).
127
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BEER was rejected due to the phrase “fat cock” despite a potential
meaning of “fat rooster” rather than “fat penis” because a Google search
indicated that the phrase “fat cock” is vulgar and used in a sexual
context.129 The applicant submitted a preliminary label indicating the
intended meaning is that of “fat rooster” but this evidence was ruled
insufficient to overcome the rejection because of the preliminary status.
b. Visual Context
When visual context is taken into account for a double entendre or
humorous mark as part of the overall commercial impression of the
mark, it is used in the dataset solely to bolster, rather than to rebut, an
examiner’s initial rejection. In the case of POST-TITS, while the
applicant pointed out the parodying nature of the goods, the examiner
determined that imagery of breasts on the note pads made the mark
vulgar, and that vulgarity made the mark scandalous.130 Likewise in the
case of BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD, the examining attorney
found that the image of the bat with two baseballs reinforced the mark’s
vulgar meaning and rendered the mark scandalous.131 The same is true
for the mark CAMEL TOES, in which the examiner stated that the
design of the mark dissipated any double entendre and clearly
communicated the mark’s vulgar nature.132
However, in what appears to be a contradiction, for the mark YOU
CUM LIKE A GIRL,133 the examiner pointed out that a third-party
registration brought up by the applicant, CUM TOGETHER,134 is a
double entendre referencing a Beatles song and was therefore
acceptable.

129
130
131
132
133
134

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011).
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003).
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006).
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002).
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005).
CUM TOGETHER, Registration No. 2,844,606.
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Out of all marks with visual elements that contribute to the overall
commercial impression of the mark, the visual context was not
discussed by either the examiner or the applicant in roughly half of
those records. Instead, the examiner focused on the words themselves
as vulgar, abstracted from the visual context, and therefore scandalous
or immoral. For many of those marks, the visual context of the mark
likely would not have been beneficial as it most frequently contributed
to the overall commercial impression of the mark is such a way as to
reinforce the vulgar implication with which the examiner was
concerned.
In rejections that addressed visual context as part of the
commercial impression of the mark, the issue was raised most often in
the initial Office Action and used only by the examiner to reinforce the
vulgar or scandalous rejection. In three cases, the visual context of the
mark was not discussed until the second Office Action, and in each of
those situations the context was used exclusively to reinforce the
vulgarity of the mark.135
Applicants did occasionally attempt to bring in the visual context
of the mark in their responses. However, of those, only two
successfully used that context to dispute the Section 2(a) rejection,
WHITE ASS and FUGLY FRUITS. This was the case even when there
were aspects of the visual context supporting a non-vulgar reference.

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,082,839 (filed July 12, 2010) (BONER BIBLE);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH YOUR TITS);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002) (CAMEL TOES).
135
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For instance, WHITE ASS included ears and a tail on the “A” in the
mark, clearly indicating that the mark referenced the “donkey” meaning
of the word “ass,” rather than any vulgar meaning.136 Despite this, the
visual context was not apparently referred to by the examiner who relied
solely on the meaning of the phrase “white ass” when initially rejecting
the mark. After the applicant pointed out the visual aspects of the mark,
the examiner withdrew the Section 2(a) rejection.137 In FUGLY
FRUITS, the applicant pointed to the “playful stylized form” to support
their argument that “fugly” meant “fun ugly” rather than “fucking
ugly.”138 After this argument was raised, the Section 2(a) refusal was
withdrawn.
In some cases, the examiner and the applicant focused on different
aspects of the design to support their respective positions. In DONKEY
PUNCH, the applicant pointed out that there was an actual donkey on
the label, supporting his assertion that the mark referred to an actual
donkey rather than the sexual term.139 However, the examiner pointed
out that the phrase “You’ll know it when it hits you in the back of the
head!” also appears on the label, thus implying the scandalous meaning
is in fact what was intended.140 In the case of SCHLONG WEAR, the
applicant asserted that the image comprised two monkeys with the boy
monkey offering the girl monkey a banana, to be colored yellow in the
final tag, and that the banana was in no way attached to or near the boy
monkey’s groin to imply a sexual meaning.141 The examiner insisted
that the fact that the boy monkey is offering the girl monkey a long,
thick object reinforced the imagery of the word “schlong” and that
modifications to the mark (coloring the banana yellow and giving the
girl monkey a tail) did not change that.142
In other situations in which the applicant attempted to use visual
context to argue that the overall commercial impression of the mark was
not scandalous, the examiner either did not address that context in
subsequent Office Actions or dismissed the evidence altogether. For
example, in the mark HAND JOB, though the applicant attached an
image of the company’s logo, which reinforced the double entendre
rather than the scandalous meaning given the clear statement of “Nails
& Spa” below the main mark, the examiner did not address the visual
context in the subsequent Office Action.143 In FAT COCK BEER,

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010).
Id.
138 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,736,643 (filed Oct. 19, 2005) (Response to Office
Action dated May 25, 2006).
139 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,089,125 (filed Jan. 23, 2007).
140 Id. (Second Office Action dated Oct. 11, 2007).
141 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed Feb. 15, 2009).
142 Id. (Second Office Action dated June 8, 2006).
143 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009).
136
137
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because the label was still preliminary, though it did in fact depict an
actual rooster, the visual mark was ruled not to overcome the
objection.144
Overall, visual context is frequently not addressed by examining
attorneys except when it supports rejection, and even an assertion of the
visual context by the applicant appears not to be beneficial unless it is
so clear as to create no doubt about the underlying meaning of the
term.145
c. Third-Party Registrations
Several applicants in the dataset raised third-party registrations in
their responses. Most often, the examiner’s response was that thirdparty registrations are irrelevant and each mark must stand on its own.
Examiners also stated that “whether because of administrative error or
otherwise, some marks have been registered even though they may be in
violation of the governing statutory standard [but that] does not mean
that the agency must forgo applying that standard in all other cases.” 146
This is despite the fact that some registered marks contain the same or
very similar words or imagery in them. On the occasions in which the
previously registered mark was recognized by the examiner in the
subsequent Office Action, it was used exclusively to distinguish such
marks from the instant application.
For example, when addressing the BONER BATS mark, the
applicant submitted evidence of third-party registrations with similar
words and imagery, but the examiner stated that these marks are not
only irrelevant but also neutral because none of them are referencing a
penis like BONER BATS.147 This was despite the fact that several of
the marks used the word “boner” in the same sense and at least one,
BONERWEAR148 had a mark consisting of an upright bone with two
skulls at its base, very similar to BONER BATS’s bat with baseballs
imagery. Similarly, for the mark YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL,149 though
the applicant used the mark CUM TOGETHER150 to support
registration, the examiner stated that the double entendre of that mark
made it acceptable.

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011).
Such as in the WHITE ASS mark. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed
Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS)
146 In re Blvd. Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
147 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006).
148 BONERWEAR, Registration No. 3,163,407.
149 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005).
150 Registration No. 2,844,606.
144
145
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4. Applicants’ Contextual Arguments are Rarely Successful in
Overturning a Refusal

In general, if an examiner did not discuss context in the initial
scandalousness rejection, almost half the time (43%) 151 the examiner
discussed context in a subsequent Office Action. Overall, examiners
addressed contextual factors in subsequent Office Actions 66%152 of the
time, whether or not these factors were brought up previously. Of cases
in which the applicant argued context, whether initially addressed by the
examiner or not, context was not raised in only 20% of final Office
Actions.
However, a contextual argument on behalf of the applicant did not
increase the chances that an examiner would address context in a
subsequent Office Action. Though 64%153 of applicant responses
argued contextual factors, when the examiner did not address context in
the initial Office Action and the applicant addressed context in a
response, only 50%154 of subsequent Office Actions addressed that
contextual argument.
42.55%.
65.96%.
153 63.83%.
154 This is out of the thirty responses where the applicant argued context. In fifteen subsequent
Office Actions, the examiner also discusses context (where context was not addressed initially).
Additionally, there were six times (20% of responses with context) where, even though the
applicant discussed context, the subsequent Office Actions did not. The remaining records were
split between five instances where context was addressed in both the initial Office Action and the
response, and four records consisted of the two marks where the 2(a) rejection was withdrawn
and two where the application was abandoned prior to the issuance of a subsequent Office Action.
151
152

Carpenter & Garner – NSFW: Scandalous Trademarks

356

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 33:321

F. There are Inconsistencies in Reasoning Across Refusals
Several words that served as the basis of a scandalousness refusal
in some marks were material components of other marks that passed
through to publication. For each of the published marks, those words
were generally not flagged as presenting an issue.155
1. There are Many Marks Containing the Same Terms That Have
Been Both Registered and Refused
Despite the abstraction of salient terms in particular marks by the
USPTO, there are often both approvals and rejections for marks
containing the same terms with very similar overall commercial
impressions.156 While POTHEAD THE CREATIVE HIGH157 was
registered, for example, POTHEAD 420158 was rejected on the basis
that “pothead” is slang for smoker of marijuana. WET BEAVER159 was
approved, while BIG WET ROUND BOOTYS & ILL FLOWS160 was
rejected. The latter mark was rejected because use of the word “wet,”
with other words like “booty,” reinforced the scandalous meaning.161
With the exception of PHAG, which were ultimately registered. Registration No. 4,135,694.
In addition to the examples noted here from our data set, there are others that create
interesting distinctions. Though most marks with the word “cock” in our sample were rejected, it
has also been permitted registration. COCKSOX was registered, for example, even though the
specimen clearly indicates that the word is likely in reference to a penis, and the most common
reason for refusing a mark with the word “cock” in it is because the term is vulgar slang for a
penis. COCKSOX, Registration No. 4,123,962. In several cases, the context of the mark
reinforces this meaning and further supports the rejection but in many, the word alone is enough
without any further context. The mark GOD DOES NOT HAVE A PENIS was rejected because
the mark was likely offensive due the reference to God and the existence of a penis or genitalia.
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,212,829 (filed June 22, 2007). In the approved mark,
HAPPY PENIS, the USPTO does not make a reference to the word “penis.” Registration No.
2,853,632. This mark is brought up by the applicant for COPYCOCK.XXX who specifically
noted that:
HAPPY PENIS [RN: 2853632] is a registered trademark . . . Yet you request to deny
my trademark for COPYCOCK because . . . “the term Cock in the proposed mark is a
reference to a penis and is thus scandalous because it is considered vulgar usage.” YET
HAPPY PENIS IS ACCEPTABLE? When I think about rubbing body lotion from
Happy Penis on my body . . . I do think of a PENIS. This doesn’t make sense to me. If
I had filed for HAPPY COPYCOCK would that have not been vulgar . . . as long as
it’s HAPPY it’s okay?
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24, 2005) (Paper Correspondence
Incoming dated Jan. 4, 2007).
157 Registration No. 2,058,380.
158 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,290,998 (filed Sept. 27, 2007).
159 Registration No. 2,437,957.
160 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,955,262 (filed Aug. 18, 2006).
161 Though “wet” alone is not a cause for rejection, in the rejected mark, BIG WET ROUND
BOOTYS & ILL FLOWS, the word “wet” is used in conjunction with other scandalous words
that reinforced the scandalousness of the mark. However, the approved mark WET BEAVER
appears to stand in contrast to this given that, based on rejected marks with the word “beaver” in
them, “beaver” is considered a scandalous term due to being vulgar slang for female genitalia or
pubic area. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008)
(BEAVERSHAVER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,571,207 (filed Feb. 19, 2005)
155
156
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This contradiction persists despite the fact that the word “beaver” has
been separately rejected for scandalousness.162
Similarly,
163
164
MILFHUNTER
and FAT MILF
were approved, while GOT
MILF165 was refused registration.166 CAMEL TOES AND DESIGN167
for apparel was rejected because “camel toe” is “well-known [as] crotch
cleavage.”168 The word mark NICE CAMELTOE169 was rejected for
the same reason.170 In contrast, the word mark CAMEL TOES171 was
registered for apparel without objection. Marks with the salient terms
ANAL,172 ASS,173 COCK,174 CUM,175 FAG,176 MILF,177 PENIS,178
(HORNY BEAVER). However, the only apparent rejection for the mark was for being
ornamental based on the Office Action response on file.
162 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,571,207 (filed Feb. 19, 2005) (HORNY
BEAVER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008)
(BEAVERSHAVER).
163 Registration No. 2,936,139.
164 Registration No. 3,372,094.
165 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005).
166 MILFHUNTER and FAT MILF, were both approved without any reference to the word
“MILF” although MILFHUNTER was initially refused for being descriptive. MILFHUNTER,
Registration No. 2,936,139; FAT MILF, Registration No. 3,372,094. In contrast, in the rejected
marks, MILF, as a vulgar acronym including the word “fuck,” was the reason the marks were
rejected. See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,043,802 (filed Nov. 14, 2006)
(MILF SEEKER), U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,614,007 (filed Apr. 21, 2005)
(MILF GOLF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,126,313 (filed Mar. 8, 2007) (MILF
AND COOKIES). Additionally, as pointed out in GOT MILF and WANT MILF? the term is
commonly associated with porn. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,710,449 (filed [date])
(WANT MILF?); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) (GOT
MILF).
167 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002).
168 Also, the design element reinforces the vulgar meaning.
169 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,253,440 (filed May 22, 2003).
170 In that Office Action, the examining attorney notes that “camel toe” refers to “to the shape
formed by the vulva when extremely tight pants are worn.”
171 Registration No. 1,872,570.
172 In the Office Action for the approved mark, HUSTLER’S ANAL SEDUCTION, there is no
mention of the word “anal” and the only rejection is for a disclaimer. Registration No. 2,920,403.
In both rejected marks, HERFIRSTANALSEX and HER FIRST ANAL SEX, only the first is
rejected because of the word “anal” (it refers to an activity that is considered immoral by some
people and illegal in some states) while the second is only refused for being descriptive and
possibly misdescriptive. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,618,381 (filed Apr. 27, 2005)
(HERFIRSTANALSEX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,043,892 (filed Nov. 14,
2006).
173 Though “ass” is present in both approved and rejected marks, the word is never mentioned in
the approved marks and in the rejected marks, “ass” alone is not the basis for refusal except in a
single case. Instead, in the rejected marks, they are rejected for compound words such as
“asshole” or because of the presence of other words in the mark such as “mother fucker” or “coon
ass.” See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS)
(rejected because the phrase “white ass” was scandalous); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,753,763 (filed Nov. 14, 2005) (SEXYASSMOFO.COM) (rejected because “mofo” is slang for
“mother fucker; “sexyass” adds to offensiveness); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,087,533 (filed Jan. 21, 2007) (ASSHOLES ANONYMOUS) (rejected because “asshole” is
vulgar slang); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,613,333 (filed Apr. 20, 2005) (KA
KICK ASS SKATEBOARDS KABOARDS) (rejected based on the design portion of the mark
depicting “a dog skeleton defecating or jumping over a pile of excrement”)U.S. Trademark
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SLUT,179 and WHORE180 are other examples of marks that were both
Application Serial No. 77,163,723 (filed Apr. 23, 2007) (HARD ASS CRACKER) (rejected
based on “cracker” as an offensive term). But see KICKASSMUSIC.COM, Registration No.
2,796,559; KICK ASS LIMITED, Registration No. 2,039,645. In a single case, JEWS KICK
ASS, the mark was rejected because of the association of famous people with profanity. U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,344,588 (filed Dec. 23, 2003).
174 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (“TALKING
COCK”); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY
COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,867,619 (filed Apr. 23, 2006) (COCK
BLOCKER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,791,173 (filed Jan. 13, 2006). But see
COCKSOX, Registration No. 4,123,962. See also discussion, supra note 156.
175 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No 78,059,173 (filed Apr. 19, 2001) (CUM); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,572,277 (filed Feb. 22, 2005) (CUMSTRONG); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,138,948 (filed Mar. 23, 2007) (FUN CUM); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,663,546 (filed July 24, 2006) (CUM PARTAY); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,317,522 (filed Oct. 31, 2007) (GOT CUM?). But see CUM
CUM, INC., Registration No. 2,036,162. CUM CUM, INC. has no documents other than a
registration certificate available on the TSDR. However, its registration is in contrast with six
marks that were rejected bearing the same word. All of the rejected marks were rejected because
the word “cum” means semen or ejaculate and is therefore vulgar.
176 In the approved mark, though PHAG is initially rejected on disparaging grounds because
“phag” is a phonetic equivalent to “fag,” the mark eventually is approved after being revived.
PHAG, Registration No. 4,135,694. In the three rejected marks, the term in the marks is “fag”
rather than an alternate phonetic equivalent. In the case of BFF BIG FUCKING FAGGOT, the
mark is refused because “faggot” is a disparaging word and is combined with a vulgar term and
therefore scandalous. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,722,463 (filed Apr. 25, 2009)
(BFF BIG FUCKING FAGGOT). In the other two marks, “fag” is a disparaging term and
therefore the marks are rejected. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,164,481 (filed Sept.
16, 2002) (FAG); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,565,055 (filed Sept. 8, 2008)
(FAGHAGMATCH.COM).
177 Both approved marks, MILFHUNTER and FAT MILF, were both approved without any
reference to the word “MILF” although MILFHUNTER was initially refused for being
descriptive. MILFHUNTER, Registration No. 2,936,139; FAT MILF, Registration No.
3,372,094. In contrast, in the rejected marks, MILF, as a vulgar acronym including the word
“fuck,” was the reason the marks were rejected. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,126,313 (filed Mar. 8, 2007) (MILF AND COOKIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78,614,007 (filed Apr. 21, 2005) (MILF GOLF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77,043,802 (filed Nov. 14, 2006) (MILF SEEKER). Additionally, as pointed out in GOT MILF
and WANT MILF?, the term is commonly associated with porn. U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) (GOT MILF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,710,449 (filed Sept. 9, 2005) (WANT MILF?).
178 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,212,829 (filed June 22, 2007) (GOD DOES
NOT HAVE A PENIS (GDNHAP)). But see HAPPY PENIS, 2,853,632. See also discussion,
supra note 149.
179 The approved mark SLUT.XXX was initially refused for being descriptive and an
unacceptable specimen, however the word “slut” never came up. SLUT.XXX, Registration No.
3,243,680. It is particularly interesting that this mark had “.XXX” in it similarly to
GAYFACIALSXXX, FUCK.XXX, and COPYCOCK.XXX. However, in two of those cases, the
presence of “.XXX” served to reinforce the sexual meaning (the XXX never came up in
GAYFACIALSXXX though the examiner does note the mark is applied to sexually explicit
services). Of the three rejected marks that contained “slut,”—S.L.U.T.S., SLUT PUPPY,
BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS—two were rejected for different reasons than the presence of the
word “slut.” S.L.U.T.S. was rejected for likelihood of confusion. U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 77,368,404 (filed Jan. 10, 2008). SLUT PUPPY was rejected for needing a disclaimer.
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,948,669 (filed Aug. 9, 2006). That being said,
BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS was rejected because “cock” and “sluts” are vulgar terms. U.S.
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approved and rejected—in some instances the marks were refused
registration based on scandalousness, and in others they passed through
to registration without issuance of an Office Action.
We conducted an in-depth look at trademark applications for
marks containing the words BITCH, POTHEAD, SHIT, SLUT, and
WHORE, in order to understand the depth of the inconsistencies both
within and between marks. There was some measure of inconsistency
within marks containing each of these terms as a primary feature. In
fact, for each term, there were both approved and rejected registrations.
With the exception of SHIT, all of the words listed above had registered
marks containing those terms as a primary feature of the mark. Even in
the case of SHIT, however, there were several marks that were
approved but abandoned prior to publication.

2. Marks Containing Some Terms Tend to be Rejected, and Others Tend
to be Accepted, Inconsistently
Overall, the data indicate general trends among trademark
examiners to either approve or deny marks containing particular terms.
For example, examiners tend to reject marks containing the word “shit,”
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006).
180 Interestingly, though the word “whore” is in both an approved mark and three rejected marks,
none of them mention it in any Office Actions. The approved mark WM WHOREMOANS was
initially rejected for a discrepancy in in entity type but no other reasons. WM WHOREMOANS,
Registration No. 3,506,488. The other three marks—DUMB BLONDE WHORES, THE
WHORE STORE, and THEY’RE ALL WHORES, AL—were refused on other grounds but the
word “whore” never came up. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,022,334 (filed Apr. 23,
2010) (THE WHORE STORE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,610,626 (filed Apr.
18, 2005) (THEY’RE ALL WHORES, AL); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,731,907
(filed May 7, 2009) (DUMB BLONDE WHORES).
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but register marks with the words “bitch” and “whore.” This appears to
be based on a de facto, unofficial consideration of third-party
registrations by examiners in the examination process. Anecdotal
evidence in the records demonstrates that examiners consider thirdparty registrations selectively when approving or rejecting applications
for registration. For example, there is an email in the record from the
examiner for SEXY BITCH to an apparent supervisor, stating:
[T]here are 34 registered marks with the word ‘Bitch’ as either the
mark or a component thereof, such as FILMBITCH for TV
production services, BITCH for a women’s magazine,
BITCHWEAR for clothing, TOTAL BITCH for cosmetics. We are
not going to hold SEXY BITCH 2(a) – please let me know if you
think we should.181

One particularly troubling instance of this inconsistency was
evident in the USPTO records regarding a refusal for NBB NATURAL
BORN BITCHES.182 In that record, the examiner noted that it was an
“uphill” battle to reject the mark, but did so anyway. 183 The applicant
was an individual filing pro se, and did not respond to the refusal, so the
application went abandoned without further inquiry. 184
In the case of marks containing POTHEAD, only one mark was
rejected. In the Office Action for that mark, POTHEAD 420, the
examiner stated that the term “pothead” is disapproving slang for “a
regular or heavy smoker of marijuana” and “420” is also slang for
smoking marijuana.185 Because the mark references an illegal activity,
it was rejected for being scandalous. However, the rest of the marks we
analyzed that included the term “pothead” were not rejected under
Section 2(a), and, in fact, three were registered.186 In particular, despite
the rejection of POTHEAD 420 in part because of the “420,” a different
mark, THE POTHEAD DIARIES EST. 4.20.09 was registered with no
Section 2(a) rejection despite the same reference.187
Where there are general trends indicating approval or refusal for
marks containing a particular term, those general trends are apparently
Registration No. 2,870,126 (Email Incoming dated Aug. 30, 3002) (Email from Mary Sparrow
to Debbie Cohn and Ron Williams, August 26, 2002. Deborah Cohn later served as
Commissioner of Trademarks from 2010–14).
182 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,507,090 (filed Oct. 27, 2004) (NBB NATURAL
BORN BITCHES).
183 Id. (Notation to File dated June 9, 2005) (Karla Perkins, “discussed uphill 2(a) with TS”).
184 Id.
185 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,290,998 (filed Sept. 27, 2007).
186 This is 23.08% of the marks we looked at containing POTHEAD. POTHEAD, Registration
No. 3,956,340; POTHEADS, Registration No. 4,365,056; THE POTHEAD DIARIES EST.
4.20.09, Registration No. 4,534,051.
187 Registration No. 4,534,051.
181
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inconsistent with one another. That is, why should marks with SHIT be
rejected in the abstract categorically, while marks with BITCH or SLUT
or WHORE tend to proceed to publication (again, in the abstract, and
categorically)?
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G. The Morality Bar is Not Effective at Keeping Immoral Trademarks
out of the Marketplace
Our evidence shows a lot of uncertainty and inconsistency
throughout the application of the Section 2(a) bar to registration for
scandalousness. One thing, however, is clear: the bar is not succeeding
at removing trademarks from the marketplace. A majority of rejected
marks that we reviewed were easily determined to still be in use, either
by the applicant or a third party.188

Overall, 53.45% (124) of marks rejected under Section 2(a) are still in use, by either the
application or a third-party as based on Internet searches for the marks.
188
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1. A Majority of Marks Refused Registration for Scandalousness are
Still Being Used

Over half of the marks we investigated are still in use, whether by
the applicant or a third-party. In addition to those marks determined to
be in use or abandoned, the current use status of just under 5% of the
marks was unclear. Of the marks still in use, approximately half (65) of
those marks are being used by the applicant, and the rest are being used
by at least one third-party. If any or all of the marks whose current
usage was unclear are, in fact, still being used by the applicant, as much
as 61% (75) of rejected marks are still in use by the applicant after
rejection. This would also increase the number of marks still in use to
134, up to nearly 60%189 of the total rejected marks in the data set.
Even if those unknown marks are no longer in use, over half of the
rejected marks are still being used in some fashion.
Given that only eight of the marks are being used solely by the
applicant, which is fewer than 7% of the marks still in use, it is clear
that refusing registration does not prevent proliferation of the marks. In
fact, without recourse it is clear that third-parties are likely to begin
using the same mark, continuing the presence of these types of marks in
the marketplace.190 Even marks that are currently not being used have
no impediment from being used again in the future, whether by the

57.75%.
47.5% of marks still in use after rejection are being used by a third-party. Though it is
possible current users are somehow affiliated with the original applicant, it is equally possible the
current user is a completely separate entity.
189
190
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original applicant or someone new.
CONCLUSION
According to the applicable legal standard, the determination of
whether a mark is scandalous and thus barred from registration should
be made in the context of current attitudes of the day. The relevant
inquiry is whether a substantial composite of the general public would
find the mark scandalous in the context of the particular marketplace in
contemporary society. However, most refusals in our dataset failed to
consider context of any kind, either in the commercial impression of the
mark or the marketplace in which the goods/services are found. Despite
the fact that they are abstracted from the marketplace, dictionary
definitions have been held to be sufficient to support a refusal, and these
are the primary evidence used to support refusals on this basis. The use
of dictionary definitions to support refusals was consistent across
various marketplaces, including “adult” or “niche” markets. When
examiners did consider context, it was nearly exclusively used as an
argument against registration: Use of a possibly scandalous mark in an
adult-oriented marketplace was an indication that a scandalous meaning
was intended; use of the mark in a general marketplace was an
indication that the mark was even more scandalous. We found the same
tendency across various goods and services, creating a catch-22 for the
applicant. While examiners often acknowledged the relevance of
context de jure, they frequently disregarded it de facto.
The implications of these findings are real. There is an impact on
the trademark registration process generally, and on small businesses
and individuals in particular, which comprise a disproportionate
percentage of applicants. These applicants also are frequently pro se
and unlikely to respond to refusals. When they do respond, they often
argue contextual factors that may or may not be addressed by USPTO
examiners and are rarely successful in overturning refusals.
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in reasoning across refusals.
There are many similar marks that have been both registered in some
cases and rejected in others. There are also comparable terms that tend
to trigger rejections or acceptances, without apparent justification for
the differential treatment. While some inconsistency is to be expected
given the non-precedential nature of third-party registrations, the
inconsistencies in our dataset were notable. In addition, to the extent
that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act seeks to keep immoral trademarks
out of the marketplace, it is not succeeding. The majority of marks
refused registration on this basis are still being used.
Trademark registration is a powerful tool to an entity interested in
building a strong brand. Registration confers significant benefits to a
trademark owner, both substantively and procedurally. The registration
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system serves also as a mechanism for consumer protection,
contributing at some level to efficiencies in the consumer marketplace.
Accordingly, bars to registration should be applied thoughtfully. Our
findings indicate that this is not the case with regard to the bar for
“scandalous” trademarks.

